



INNOVATING  
FOR PROTECTION

# MULTI-PARTY CRYPTOGRAPHY USE CASES BASED ON SECURE MULTI-PARTY COMPUTATION

ABOUT  
TRIDENT



MULTI-  
PARTY

USECASES

GIST

ABOUT & BEYOND PKI  
Feb 11, 2020

FERENC PETŐ  
ferenc.peto@i4p.com



JOIN OUR PARTNER PROGRAM  
AS RESELLER OR DISTRIBUTOR



**TRIDENT HSM is the first in the world to offer multi-party cryptography**

**Verified by the globally recognized Common Criteria EAL 4+ certification**

**eIDAS Certified Qualified Signature and Seal Creation Device**

**Post-Quantum crypto support (Sphincs+)**



**JOIN OUR PARTNER PROGRAM  
AS RESELLER OR DISTRIBUTOR**



INNOVATING  
FOR PROTECTION

# MULTI-PARTY CRYPTOGRAPHY USE CASES BASED ON SECURE MULTI-PARTY COMPUTATION

ABOUT  
TRIDENT



MULTI-  
PARTY

USECASES

GIST

ABOUT & BEYOND PKI  
Feb 11, 2020

FERENC PETŐ  
ferenc.peto@i4p.com



JOIN OUR PARTNER PROGRAM  
AS RESELLER OR DISTRIBUTOR

# MULTI-PARTY



**MULTI-PARTY  
COMPUTATION**

**MULTI-PARTY  
CRYPTOGRAPHY**



# SECURE

## MULTI-PARTY COMPUTATION

- methods for parties to jointly compute a function over their inputs while keeping those inputs private
- formally introduced in 1982 for the so-called Millionaires' Problem


Hype Cycle  
for Privacy

Yao's  
Millionaires'  
Problem

Multi-party  
computation on  
shared secret

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure\\_multi-party\\_computation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_multi-party_computation)

Figure 1. Hype Cycle for Privacy, 2018



# Millionaires' Problem

Andrew Yao

The problem discusses two millionaires, Alice and Bob, who are interested in knowing which of them is richer without revealing their actual wealth.

**Socialist millionaires**

**Oblivious transfer**

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yao%27s\\_Millionaires%27\\_Problem](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yao%27s_Millionaires%27_Problem)

# Socialist millionaires

It is a variant of the Millionaire's Problem. Two millionaires want to determine if their wealth is equal without disclosing any information about their riches to each other.

Alice and Bob

Suggestion boxes

Oblivious messages

Result

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist\\_millionaires](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_millionaires)

# Alice and Bob



Suppose Alice and Bob each might be making either 10, 20, 30, or 40 \$/hour.

Alice makes 30\$/hour  
Bob makes 20\$/hour

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist\\_millionaires](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_millionaires)

# Suggestion boxes

Lockable with different matching keys



Bob keeps only the key for the 20\$ box and sends them to Alice



[http://twistedoakstudios.com/blog/Post3724\\_explain-it-like-im-five-the-socialist-millionaire-problem-and-secure-multi-party-computation](http://twistedoakstudios.com/blog/Post3724_explain-it-like-im-five-the-socialist-millionaire-problem-and-secure-multi-party-computation)



# Oblivious messages

Alice puts a slip of paper saying 'yes' into the 30\$ box



Bob gets back the boxes and uses his key to unlock the 20\$ box



[http://twistedoakstudios.com/blog/Post3724\\_explain-it-like-im-five-the-socialist-millionaire-problem-and-secure-multi-party-computation](http://twistedoakstudios.com/blog/Post3724_explain-it-like-im-five-the-socialist-millionaire-problem-and-secure-multi-party-computation)

# Result

Bob knows that Alice doesn't make 20\$/hour like he does.

Alice knows Bob doesn't make 30\$/hour (Bob shows Alice the slip he pulled out)

**Nobody knows how much money the other party makes**

[http://twistedoakstudios.com/blog/Post3724\\_explain-it-like-im-five-the-socialist-millionaire-problem-and-secure-multi-party-computation](http://twistedoakstudios.com/blog/Post3724_explain-it-like-im-five-the-socialist-millionaire-problem-and-secure-multi-party-computation)

# **Oblivious transfer**

In a 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer protocol, the sender has two messages  $m_0$  and  $m_1$ , and the receiver has a bit  $b$ , and the receiver wishes to receive  $m_b$ , without the sender learning  $b$ , while the sender wants to ensure that the receiver receives only one of the two messages.

**Suggestion  
boxes using  
RSA encryption**

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oblivious\\_transfer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oblivious_transfer)

Alice			Bob			
Calculus	Secret	Public		Public	Secret	Calculus
Messages to be sent	$m_0, m_1$					
Generate RSA key pair and send public portion to Bob	$d$	$N, e$	$\Rightarrow$	$N, e$		Receive public key
Generate two random messages		$x_0, x_1$	$\Rightarrow$	$x_0, x_1$		Receive random messages
					$k, b$	Choose $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and generate random $k$
		$v$	$\Leftarrow$	$v = (x_b + k^e) \pmod N$		Compute the encryption of $k$ , blind with $x_b$ and send to Alice
One of these will equal $k$ , but Alice does not know which.	$k_0 = (v - x_0)^d \pmod N$ $k_1 = (v - x_1)^d \pmod N$					
Send both messages to Bob		$m'_0 = m_0 + k_0$ $m'_1 = m_1 + k_1$	$\Rightarrow$	$m'_0, m'_1$		Receive both messages
					$m_b = m'_b - k$	Bob decrypts the $m'_b$ since he knows which $x_b$ he selected earlier.

# **Shared secret**

Additive sharing:

Each party has its own part of the secret and the sum of these parts is the global secret that is not known by any of the parties.

Other ways: e.g. Shamir's polynomial sharing


**Add constant to a shared secret**

**Multiply a shared secret by constant**

**Add 2 shared secrets**

**Threshold**


## Add constant to a shared secret



$$a+b+c+K=(a+K)+b+c$$




**Multiply a shared secret  
by constant**




$$K*(a+b+c)=K*a+K*b+K*c$$

### Add 2 shared secrets



$$(a1+b1+c1)+(a2+b2+c2) = (a1+b1)+(a2+b2)+(a3+b3)$$

## 2 out of 3 threshold



# **MULTI-PARTY CRYPTOGRAPHY**

Goals:

key generation:

- whole key is never in one place

key usage:

- secret-key parts never assembled, only used to separately create one cryptographic function

**RSA**

**ECC**

**AES**

# **RSA**




Key generation:

Distributed Miller-Rabin primality test

Each of the parties have primes and so the private key ( $d$ ) as shared secret

**Key usage**

## Multi-party modular exponentiation





# ECC

Key generation:

No need for complex multi-party key generation methods

Random number generation by each parties

Key usage:

SMPC operations with the shared secrets and domain parameters

# AES

Key generation:

Random number generation by each parties

Key usage:

SMPC operations

Exciting problem of using lookup tables with an index that is remaining shared secret



INNOVATING  
FOR PROTECTION

# MULTI-PARTY CRYPTOGRAPHY USE CASES BASED ON SECURE MULTI-PARTY COMPUTATION

ABOUT  
TRIDENT



MULTI-  
PARTY

USECASES

GIST

ABOUT & BEYOND PKI  
Feb 11, 2020

FERENC PETŐ  
ferenc.peto@i4p.com



JOIN OUR PARTNER PROGRAM  
AS RESELLER OR DISTRIBUTOR

# MULTI-PARTY USE CASES


**Enhanced  
protection**


**Possession  
factor**

## Enhanced protection of your crypto keys

Instead of storing your keys in one single place, you can store it in a distributed cluster

**MOST  
VALUABLE  
KEYS**





e.g. CA's root key,  
master keys etc.




# **Possessing a key part**


parties maybe in an untrusted environment and (even) with conflicting interests to perform a single crypto operation


**Co-signing**

**Privacy**

**Group Identification**









INNOVATING  
FOR PROTECTION

# MULTI-PARTY CRYPTOGRAPHY USE CASES BASED ON SECURE MULTI-PARTY COMPUTATION

ABOUT  
TRIDENT



MULTI-  
PARTY

USECASES

GIST

ABOUT & BEYOND PKI  
Feb 11, 2020

FERENC PETŐ  
ferenc.peto@i4p.com



JOIN OUR PARTNER PROGRAM  
AS RESELLER OR DISTRIBUTOR



# JUST THE GIST

**Secure multi-party computation helps you to protect your secret in a way that is never seen before**

**Possessing at least one part of your secret can provide you possessing the whole secret**

**Physical protection of that secret is essential**



INNOVATING  
FOR PROTECTION

# MULTI-PARTY CRYPTOGRAPHY USE CASES BASED ON SECURE MULTI-PARTY COMPUTATION

ABOUT  
TRIDENT



MULTI-  
PARTY

USECASES

GIST

ABOUT & BEYOND PKI  
Feb 11, 2020

FERENC PETŐ  
ferenc.peto@i4p.com



JOIN OUR PARTNER PROGRAM  
AS RESELLER OR DISTRIBUTOR